The prevailing Wall Street narrative often suggests that embracing socially, faith-based, value-based, or sustainable practices, collectively known as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), equates to sacrificing profits for a feel-good factor.
Contrary to this, CSR is not a new concept, with roots tracing back to the World Bank's initiatives in 1948 aimed at post-World War II community rebuilding (Hochstadter & Scheck, 2015; O’Donahue et al., 2010; Casanovas & Jones, 2022).
However, emerging evidence suggests that shareholder activism advocating for CSR has proven effective in prompting corporations to adopt more socially responsible policies despite its controversial nature. Critics argue that such activism can lead to higher prices and label advocates of Environmental, Social, and Corporate Governance (ESG) as "Woke," Stakeholder Capitalists, or even Marxists.
Notably, figures like Florida Governor Ron DeSantis have taken a strong stance against ESG, viewing it as a form of "woke" politics. DeSantis contends that shareholder advocacy for ESG prioritizes political ideology over the fiduciary duty to make optimal financial decisions for beneficiaries (News release from Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, May 2, 2023).
The debate centers on whether voting values implies a slippery slope to socialism or is merely an exaggeration. Socially, faith-based, value-based, or sustainable investing, as described by Peck (2011, pp 202-203), involves making money while incorporating personal beliefs into investment decisions. Analyst Shannon Zimmerman found in a 2015 study that ESG-incorporated funds often delivered risk-adjusted results on par with or better than their peers.
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 heightened consumer and investor attention to CSR and ESG, leading to initiatives like the Rockefeller Brothers Fund's decision to divest from fossil fuels after attending the United Nations summit on climate change (Goldenberg, 2015; Dawkins, 2016).
Proponents of Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) argue that positive investment screens may enhance profitability through increased stakeholder loyalty, higher sales, and lower production costs than firms with perceived ESG-related risks (Herremans et al., 2006).
Shareholder activism, facilitated through proxy voting rights granted by the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, allows shareholders to influence corporate behavior. While not always successful, evidence suggests that SRI can improve firm value when resolutions gain support (Sitkoff & Grey, 2020). Socially responsible investors and stakeholders are increasingly pushing for conduct policies related to ESG (Bhattacharyaa et al., 2008; Flammer et al., 2019; Reid & Toffel, 2009; Mackey et al., 2020).
Activist investors like Carl Icahn, Bill Ackerman, and David Einhorn collaborate with pension funds, money managers, and influential shareholders to reshape corporate strategies—a process known as "co-signing a shareholder resolution" (SEC, 2022). Furthermore, "impact investing," a subordinate strategy of SRI, responds to the growing demand for a more ethical and socially inclusive perspective on capitalism (Dacin et al., 2011, p. 1204; Hochstadter & Scheck, 2014).
Shareholders are seen to have a moral duty to family, community, and a higher power by using money for good. Investing, therefore, is considered both a moral act and a fiduciary duty. Shareholders must promote accountability, transparency, and the well-being of the firm's stakeholders.
Active participation from investors and shareholders and collaboration is deemed crucial for establishing Corporate Social Responsibility, as it holds boards of directors and executives accountable. Shareholder activism is seen as a critical driver in achieving these objectives.
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